Americans are being asked to back the 'vice chairman' because he is a friend. Actually, he is an enemy and the real intention is to undermine U.S.- ROC relations
In recent months, editorials and articles about Teng Hsiao-ping have appeared in a number of American newspapers, including the New York Times and Baltimore Sun. These expressions tend to be based on a strange line of reasoning that runs somewhat like this:
— Teng is the key figure in improving Washington-Peiping relations. Right now he is caught up in a political struggle and cannot afford more difficulties without the risk that he will fall from power.
— Upgrading of the Reagan administration's relations with the Republic of China would be a blow to Teng and might result in his overthrow.
— Should Teng be purged, the United States couldn't find another such pro-American figure in Red China. The U.S. policy of restraining the Soviet Union would receive a severe setback.
— The Reagan administration consequently should solidify the relationship with the Chinese Communists through Teng before engaging in any new tacks toward the Republic of China.
It is surprising that American analysts should suddenly have decided that Teng is threatened and may be toppled at any time. Why should they have concluded that he is the key factor in assuring the success of the anti-Soviet policy? Why should they be so generous in extending him a helping hand? Their conceit is surprising.
First, Teng Hsiao-ping is a Communist and not pro-American. It was Mao Tse-tung and not Teng who opened the mainland door to Kissinger and Nixon and finally brought about Washington-Peiping "normalization." Mao advanced the concept of First, Second and Third Worlds. But it was Teng who developed the idea into a theory and announced it to the world at the sixth special meeting of the United Nations General Assembly April 12, 1974. He said peace was not possible in a world where the "imperialists" were arrayed against the "socialists." He predicted either war or a "people's revolution."
In 1979, after a two-month tour of the United States, Chang Kuan-tou, the vice president of "Tsinghua University," exalted socialism on a basis of Communist theory and his experiences in the United States. His assessment was approved by the Chinese Communist party. "The United States," he said, "is actually neo-colonialist. Americans control us through military bases, economic monopoly and religion." He added that making friends with the United States would not mean that everything was fine. "Realistically, the United States will still be an imperialist. It is merely engaged in an anti-hegemony front with (Red) China," he said.
A book on political economy published by the Kansu "People's Publishing Company" and used as a mainland college textbook describes the United States as a country which has reached the acme of capitalism. That means imperialism in the Marxist-Leninist lexicon. Such teachings are dictated by the Teng clique. From 1974 to 1980, a period in which Teng was denigrated and came back again, he never changed his basic intention of making the United States the target of Communist revolution. If there is any difference in Teng it is to be found in his cessation of public pronouncements and acceptance of silent preparations more in keeping with the objective situation.
Second, the survival or downfall of Teng will be decided by the Chinese Communists and not by the Americans. Teng must substitute his own clique for the Chinese Communist party or fail. This has nothing to do with Washington.
Teng Hsiao-ping has already failed twice and is now involved in his third bid for the power to reshape Communism. At the beginning of the 1960s, Teng and Liu Shao-chi compelled Mao to retreat. They revised the party constitution at the "eighth national congress," establishing the honorary post of "chairman" for Mao. But Mao created the "cultural revolution" and frustrated their intentions. That was Teng's first political setback. Then, in the conflict between Mao and Chou En-lai, Teng was used by Mao and became vice-chairman of the Chinese Communist party central committee, vice chairman of the CCPCC military commission, chief of the army general staff and vice premier of the state council. He was in charge of the day-to-day affairs of the council and appeared in line to succeed Mao. Two days after the Tienanmen incident of April 5, Teng was deprived of all his posts by resolution of the central politburo. His third rise to power may be counted from July of 1977. He first won the right to interpret Communism at the 3rd plenum of the 11th CCPCC, thus firmly establishing his ideological line. At the 4th plenum, he pushed through his political line and seized the leadership. His organizational line moved to the fore at the 5th plenum. He appeared to have quickly succeeded in substituting his clique for the party. His bringing to trial of the "Lin Piao and Chiang Ching cliques" signaled a general offensive against his enemies. However, the trial resulted in only light sentences. While trying to score a knockout, Teng had become involved in Mao's dilemma of struggling to move forward or failing to struggle and fading into retrogression and collapse. Teng must find solutions to the difficult problems of getting rid of Chiang Ching, purging Hua Kuo-feng, expelling Yeh Chien-ying, criticizing Mao Tse-tung, regaining popular support, deceiving the United States and competing with the Soviet Union. These are the challenges that will decide his rise or fall. The analysis of the Americans is not of much help.
Third, Teng's rapprochement with the United States is a deadly blow to him. In the 1975 movement to criticize A'l Men Are Brothers, Teng's party opponents (the "gang of four") denounced his capitulationism - that to the bourgeoisie at home and to imperialism abroad. In the last few years, Teng has flocked with the rightists, returned properties of the bourgeoisie confiscated during the "cultural revolution" and employed such a bourgeois element as Jung Yi-jen for economic development. These developments show that the "gang of four" made a correct assessment of Teng and that he is a traitor to the Communist cause. In defending Teng, the U.S. editorialists have given credence to the representations of the gang. To represent Teng as pro-American and say that no other such friend can be found in Red China will serve him poorly and play into the hands of his opponents.
Fourth, the American writers lack insight into the self-centered and capricious character of Teng Hsiao-ping. During the "cultural revolution," Teng conducted several self-examinations in an effort to deceive Mao and gain his trust. While coping with the "Liu Shao-chi anti-party clique" at the 9th "national party congress," Mao did not make a decision in Teng's case. On March 2, 1976, Chiang Ching said at a conference of 12 provinces and autonomous regions: "Mao Tse-tung told me long ago to separate the cases of Teng Hsiao-ping and Liu Shao-chi. I had high expectations of Teng, since I had taken note of Mao's efforts to protect him, to bring him back and re-establish his reputation and prestige. I even felt he could be a factor for stability and unity." This showed what Teng had done to oblige Mao and Chiang at that time. The true significance of Teng's attitude was not understood by the world until after the death of Mao and the trial of Chiang Ching.
The world tends to regard Teng Hsiao-ping and Chou En-lai as "moderates," but when Teng gave a lecture on the "cultural revolution" and the "criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius" at the United Nations April 12, 1974, he said: "The proletarian cultural revolution that has been going on in (mainland) China for the last several years as well as the current movement to criticize Lin Piao and Confucius are intended to prevent the restoration of capitalism and ensure the perpetuation of socialism in (Communist) China." The recent Peiping trial shows that Chiang Ching was criticizing Confucius in order to criticize Chou En-lai at that time. In other words, Teng Hsiao-ping was a remnant of the "gang of four."
After Hua Kuo-feng and Yeh Chien-yin joined hands to arrest the "gang of four," Teng wrote three letters expressing his support for Hua as chairman of the Chinese Communist party and asking Hua to give him something to do. He even accepted Hua's condition of "admitting mistakes before being rehabilitated." How Teng repaid Hua for raising him up again is known to everyone. Teng's egoistic and capricious character is fully revealed in his alternation of conciliation and harshness toward Mao, Chiang, Chou and Hua in keeping with the nature of the situation. This ought to serve as a warning to those who speak up for Teng as the leading friend of the United States among Chinese Communist leaders.
Fifth, the so-called moderates are not against war and in favor of democracy. Teng personally launched a war to teach the Vietnamese a lesson; he resorted to violence to settle a dispute. Although he may not have the capability to use force, he is fully willing to do so. He has recently shown his true colors with regard to democracy. Back in 1978, while undertaking a movement to justify the Tienanmen "counter-revolutionary incident" and pave the way for his struggle at the third plenary session of the 11th central committee, he told a reporter that "big character posters and democratic movements are good. They will continue to exist and there is nothing to be afraid of." Not long afterward Teng Hsiao-ping proposed amendment of the constitution to delete the people's right to speak out and air their views freely, to hold great debates and to write big character posters. Wei Ching-sheng, the young human rights activist who edited the underground magazine Exploration, criticized Kang Sheng, Wu Teh, Hua Kuo-feng and Mao Tse-tung. Teng said this was a good thing and could continue. Then on March 25, 1979, the magazine said Teng tried to capitalize on the people's confidence in him to oppose the democratic movement, to blame the democratic movement for the failure of Hua and Teng in restructuring the economy and to blame the people and make them the scapegoat for mistaken policies. Teng himself was said to be degenerating into a dictator. Wei was arrested and given a 15-year prison term on charges of divulging Communist secrets and opposing the proletarian dictatorship. His sentence is nearly as heavy as those dealt out to the evildoers of the Lin Piao and Chiang Ching cliques. Teng's advocacy of democracy and "emancipation of the mind" was aimed at enlarging his power and influence. He emphasized "stability and unity" and ''unity for progress" to advance the struggle to replace the party with his clique.
Sixth, American commentors should be aware that United States can never accept the demands of the Chinese Communists with regard to the so-called Taiwan problem. In the Chinese Communist view, there are really two problems. One concerns the return of Taiwan to the Chinese mainland and the unification of China. The other involves the efforts of the U.S. imperialists to take over Taiwan. The Communists see the first problem as an internal matter in which no foreigner may interfere. The second problem is an international issue to be resolved by U.S. withdrawal from the Taiwan area. After the Reagan administration came to power and indicated a willingness to upgrade U.S. relations with the Republic of China, the Chinese Communists expressed displeasure but concentrated their attack on the "imperialism" of Ray S. Cline, an educator and former deputy director of the CIA, rather than that of the U.S. government. Red China has always been a paper tiger sitting on a bed of thorns. In years past, this paper tiger lodged more than 200 "strong protests" against the violation of mainland airspace by "U.S. imperialist" aircraft.
Chinese Communists are trying to influence the Reagan administration's China foreign policy by indirection — by utilizing the U.S. press rather than by embarking upon any reckless or violent course. Should the Reagan administration comply and downgrade its intention to improve relations with the Republic of China, meanwhile moving to show favor to the Chinese Communists, the rest of the world will interpret this as the breaking of U.S. promises to an old friend and erstwhile ally. The Chinese Communists will be encouraged to take advantage of U.S. weakness and seek further vulnerable spots for even bolder advances. The next step will be Chinese Communist pressure on the United States to twist the Republic of China's arm in an effort to compel negotiations regarding Taiwan. The Red Chinese goal is the expulsion of the Americans from Taiwan and the seizure of the island with the U.S. as an accomplice. If the United States fails to go along, Peiping will assert that President Reagan's friendship for the Republic of China is bringing new troubles to Teng and weakening his position to the point of possible collapse. They will go on to claim that the United States can never find a pro-American Chinese Communist to compare with Teng Hsiao-ping and that alignment of the United States with Peiping to counter the Soviet Union will be placed in jeopardy. As already noted, this conclusion has been reached on the opinion pages of some American publications. Considering all the facts and circumstances, it would be difficult to invent a more absurd line of thinking.